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Abstract 
This paper examines the development of manufacturing in East Java in comparison with 
other major industrial provinces in Indonesia, with a focus on employment, output and 
investment in the pre-and-post crisis periods. East Java’s ‘winner’ and ‘loser’ industries 
and the geographical distribution of manufacturing in the province are described.  The 
paper attempts to account for manufacturing patterns in East Java in terms of 
infrastructure constraints, the investment climate, access to finance and the relationship 
between central, provincial and local governments, following the advent of regional 
autonomy.  The paper finds that East Java manufacturing has been less export oriented 
and responsive to global demand, thus failing to match the performance of the other 
major manufacturing centres in Indonesia. 
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INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT IN EAST JAVA: A SPECIAL CASE? 
 
Bambang-Heru Santosa and Heath McMichael∗
 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
 
From this time dates another characteristic of the Civil Service of East Java, namely its 
commitment to independent decision-making.  In other provinces, and most notably in West Java, 
officials are appointed primarily for their loyalty to Jakarta and their willingness to implement 
central government policies. Their success is judged by their ability to placate regional interest 
rather than in serving them. While officials in East Java can certainly be zealous in implementing 
national policies, the presumption is nonetheless that national policies need to be tailored to local 
needs and conditions and do not preclude simultaneous local initiative (Dick 1993, in Dick et al, 
p.16). 
 
Several factors may explain why a heavy concentration (of manufacturing industry) took place in 
Java.  The location of central government in Java from the colonial era had an important impact on 
the island’s history.  Licensing regulations and commercial and physical infrastructure were far 
superior in Java, and firms were encouraged to locate there (Kuncoro  2002, p.337). 
 
To some, East Java appears to be on the verge of a new phase in its development: the effects of 
deregulation since 1988 may well stimulate an even more rapid process of growth and 
industrialization in the 1990s than that of the 1970-1990 period (Preface by James Fox in Dick et 
al 1993). 
 
The first quotation above by an economist who has written widely on problems of 
industrial development in developing countries, including Indonesia and East Java, offers 
a partial explanation of the pattern of industrial development we see in East Java today.  
The second quotation is by an economist teaching at the University of Indonesia who has 
a very sound appreciation of economic geography.  It reveals the particular qualities that 
made Java a focus for manufacturing industry in Indonesia.  The third quotation reflects 
the optimism felt by many observers a decade ago that industrialisation in East Java 
would continue to accelerate in the 21st Century. 
 
Economic surveys of East Java, of which the most in-depth since the 1980s have been 
Mackie and Zain (1991), Dick (1993), and Hill (1987), have described the province as a 
high-growth success story since the 1960s, with growth spread across all major sectors in 
rural as well as urban settings. According to Mackie and Zain, growth in East Java has 
been a cumulative process in most parts of the province, not the result of investment into 
one or two leading sectors (Mackie and Zain 1991). Dick et al (1993) argue that 
beginning in the 1960s, East Java was able to capitalize on geographical diversity, a large 
population, the benefits of the ‘green revolution’ and a generally competent bureaucracy 
to sustain a ‘balanced’ pattern of growth and development.  A broad industrial base, 
rising wages and substantial purchasing power also gave East Java an advantage over 
other Indonesian provinces.  East Java was able to capitalise on a relatively large 
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manufacturing sector, well-established transport and irrigation networks and a rice 
growing and cash crop sector responsive to rising demand. 
 
Hill (1987) referred to East Java as the most industrialized province in Indonesia in light 
of its high proportion (27 per cent) of value-added in the nation’s manufacturing sector. 
East Java’s manufacturing capabilities appeared to rely much on high levels of 
productivity per worker, which offset the lower proportion of the national manufacturing 
workforce (at 21 per cent) occurring in the province. 
 
Since the 1940s, East Java has been Indonesia’s second major centre of industrial 
development after Jakarta/West-Java and Surabaya, the provincial capital, its second 
biggest modern city after Jakarta.  Benefiting from a business-friendly, dynamic 
provincial government, East Java’s manufacturing industry contributed to a provincial 
growth rate higher than for the Indonesian economy as a whole.  The average annual 
growth rate in East Java in 1980–1990 was 7.01 per cent and in 1990–1996, 7.54 per 
cent.  These figures were higher than the growth rates for Indonesia, which were 6.04 and 
7.27 per cent respectively.  
 
The question arises, why has manufacturing in East Java been left behind in the last 
decade and become less diversified than manufacturing industry in Jakarta/West Java?  
The development of East Java’s manufacturing industry is not well understood, in 
comparison with other manufacturing regions in Indonesia (and is quite different from the 
more export-oriented JABOTABEK1 region and the rest of West Java).  One hypothesis 
is that East Java does not seem to have taken advantage of international linkages in the 
deregulation period of the 1990s and has not recovered quickly in the post-crisis period.   
 
In on-going research by Hill and Athukorala2, the authors contend that the second cities 
of Malaysia and Philippines, Penang and Cebu respectively, have taken advantage of 
their links with international capital to nurture sustained economic growth.  Penang and 
Cebu have benefited from strategic positions in or near primary transport routes, modern 
shipping and airfreight infrastructure and proximity to productive agricultural hinterlands.  
The two cities more or less share these characteristics with Indonesia’s second city, 
Surabaya.  However what distinguishes Penang and Cebu from Surabaya is the high 
proportion of elaborately transformed manufacturing in the two cities, particularly of 
electronics goods, which is intended for export.  The association of Penang and Cebu 
with global manufacturing in sophisticated electronics goods and information technology 
products has stimulated the economies of both centres, and contributed to national 
economic growth in Malaysia and Philippines.  This connectivity with the global 
economy does not appear to be nearly as pronounced as in the case of Surabaya. 
 
In the same way that Penang and Cebu flourished by virtue of their robust, international 
orientation, it might be argued that manufacturing industry in Surabaya should have 
continued to prosper despite the Asian financial crisis, Krismon.   As Indonesia’s second 
city – a dynamic industrial, commercial and trade hub for East Java and Eastern 
                                                 
1 JABOTABEK stands for Jakarta, Tanggerang, Bogor, and Bekasi. 
2 Hal Hill and Prema-Chandra Athukorala (personal communication, March 2004) 
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Indonesia – Surabaya enjoys similar access to a resource-rich agricultural hinterland and 
above average air, sea and road transport connections.  However these attributes have not 
combined to lift Surabaya’s manufacturing performance to a level above that of the 
national average.  We argue that Surabaya’s failure to establish strong linkages with 
international capital and markets stymied industry diversification in East Java and 
retarded flows of foreign and domestic direct investment to East Java’s manufacturing 
sector. 
 
This paper comprises five sections.  The first section introduces East Java’s 
manufacturing landscape and poses the question why has manufacturing in East Java 
failed to attain its earlier promise as a powerhouse of economic growth for the province. 
The second section discusses the development of manufacturing in East Java in 
comparison with other major industrial provinces in Indonesia, in terms of GDP growth, 
the role of manufacturing industry, employment, manufacturing value added and 
investment in the pre-and-post crisis periods.  The third section identifies East Java’s 
‘winner’ and ‘loser’ industries and describes manufacturing in the province in terms of its 
geographic location.  The fourth section attempts to account for the pattern of 
manufacturing in East Java.  Infrastructure constraints; the investment climate; East 
Java’s financial and banking system and the relationship between central, provincial and 
local governments following the advent of regional autonomy (Otonomi Daerah), are 
considered to be the most significant factors.  The final section concludes that 
manufacturing provinces other than East Java possess an export orientation and 
responsiveness to global demand that gives these provinces an internationally competitive 
edge over East Java industry. 
 
II.  EAST JAVA MANUFACTURING DEVELOPMENT IN COMPARATIVE  
PERSPECTIVE 
 
While much has been written about the development of national economies in developing 
countries, remarkably little has been written about their sub-national regions, whether 
organised as states or provinces.  For this reason, this paper has as its focus sub-national 
regions in the form of provinces. 
 
In the pre-crisis era, East Java’s economic growth per annum was higher than that of 
Indonesia as a whole.  However, as can be seen in Table 1, two trends indicate that the 
growth of manufacturing in East Java showed signs of slowing relative to other provinces 
from as early as 1980.  Firstly, over the period 1980–2002, East Java’s manufacturing 
growth rates were lower than those in Jakarta/West Java.  Secondly, in the period after 
the crisis, the average annual growth of West Java’s manufacturing industry was nearly 
double that of East Java. 
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Table 1. Comparison of annual GDP growth of Indonesia and selected provinces (percent) 
 
  1980-1990 1990-1996 1998 1996-2002 1999-2002 
Indonesia 6.04 7.27 -13.06 1.63 2.97 
   Jakarta 9.51 8.33 -17.49 1.08 2.70 
   West Java 7.96 7.67 -17.77 1.99 4.70 
   Yogyakarta/C-Java 8.05 7.19 -11.69 1.32 2.66 
   East Java 7.01 7.54 -16.12 1.20 2.79 
Source: BPS, (Indonesia, Jakarta, West Java, Yogyakarta, Central Java, East Java) – Statistical Yearbook of 
Indonesia, Jakarta in Figures, and other provinces in figures, serial publication, calculated by authors. 
 
Based on the structure of East Java’s GRDP, it might be expected that from the start of 
the New Order era, manufacturing industry’s share of the province’s economy would be 
at least double that of the agriculture sector (BPS, East Java Statistics 2002).  In fact, 
manufacturing in East Java remained heavily reliant on the ‘single division’ of goods 
(food, beverages, and tobacco).  In recent years, the dominance of cigarette 
manufacturing in East Java in terms of its share of the national economy has declined as 
other provinces have diversified their manufacturing sectors.  Viewed nationally, large 
and medium (L&M) industry contributed more than 90 percent in terms of value added 
with the remainder being small and cottage (S&C) industry (Table 2).  Most of the 
present discussion is thus focused on L&M manufacturing rather than on S&C 
manufacturing or industry as a whole. 
 
Table 2. Distribution of value-added of Indonesia’s small and cottage manufacturing  
(2-digit ISIC), 2002 
 
    Small (%) Cottage (%) Total (%) 
Total 
(Rp.billion)
31 Food, beverages, and tobacco 9.88 18.95 28.83 7,859 
32 Textile, garments, and leathers 13.46 5.43 18.89 5,150 
33 Wood, bamboo, rattan, including furniture 6.83 19.77 26.60 7,250 
36 Nonmetallic mineral products 7.47 8.12 15.59 4,250 
39 Others 4.24 5.85 10.09 2,751 
Small & cottage (9.5 %) 41.88 58.12 100.00 27,261 
Medium & large (90.5%)    259,589 
Total manufacturing industry (100%)    286,850 
Source: BPS, Statistics Indonesia – Statistical Yearbook of Indonesia, 2002. 
 
Four provinces have dominated the manufacturing sector of Indonesia’s economy: DKI 
Jakarta; West Java; East Java; and North Sumatra3.  The last province, although not 
                                                 
3 The first two provinces may in fact be considered one entity.  During the Suharto era, Bekasi was a 
district of Jakarta, but since the beginning of the Reformasi period, it has separated to form its own 
Regency.  Tanggerang is no longer a district of Jakarta and now belongs to the new Province of Banten, 
which was created from the former West Java Province in 2001.  The three provinces, Jakarta, West Java 
and Banten, utilise the same infrastructure for carrying our international trade.  Exports and imports are 
handled through Jakarta’s Tanjung Priok seaport and Soekarno-Hatta international airport.  Most 
manufacturing industry has shifted from Pulo Gadung in Jakarta to Cikarang in West Java.  In order to 
simplify the present discussion, Jakarta and West Java (including Banten) are considered to be one zone of 
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considered as important a generator of manufacturing as provinces in Java, has made a 
significant contribution to manufacturing output, principally in the field of resource-
extraction, for instance CPO (crude palm oil), for export.  Manufacturing output from 
these four provinces made up more than 60 percent of the Indonesian economy.  Their 
economic primacy is reflected, not only in their share of GDP but also in their share of 
MVA (manufacturing value added) to GDP (Table 3).  Jakarta/West Java alone 
contributed around 30 percent to Indonesia’s GDP and constituted 35 per cent of 
manufacturing (L&M manufacturing) value added to GDP in 2001.  The second biggest 
proportion of MVA to GDP was in East Java, which in 2001 had a 31 per cent share.  
 
Table 3. Selected economic indicators for five manufacturing provinces 
 
 
Provinces 
 
Total 
Area 
(km2) 
Pop. Density
2000 
people/km2
Population 
2000 
(millions) 
GDP 2002
(Rp. 
trillions) 
Ec. growth 
1999-2002 
(% p.a.) 
GDP/capita 
2002 (Rp. 
millions) 
Share of 
MVA to 
GDP 2001 
(%) 
North Sumatera 73,587 158 11.6 86.7 3.80 7.3 9.99 
Jakarta/West Java 35,261 1,250 44.1 469.0 1.39 10.4 34.68 
Yogyakarta/C-Java 35,735 960 34.3 174 2.34 4.9 9.89 
East Java 47,922 725 34.8 227.0 2.80 6.4 30.55 
Indonesia 1,890,754 109 205.8 1,610.6 3.21 7.6 18.73 
Sources: BPS, Statistics Indonesia: Statistical Year Book of Indonesia, 2002 - Annual Medium and Large 
Manufacturing Survey (several years) 
Pop. = Population; MVA = Manufacturing Value Added; GDP = Gross Domestic Product 
 
Three other provinces in Java possess significant concentrations of manufacturing 
industry; namely Banten, Central Java and Yogyakarta.  Central Java’s manufacturing 
sector is much smaller than that of East Java.  However, in terms of the absolute value of 
manufacturing produced, Central Java’s manufacturing sector is bigger than that of North 
Sumatra, although the share to GDP is smaller. 
 
The Role of Investment and Exports 
 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) and domestic investment has had a dynamic effect on the 
development of manufacturing in Indonesia.  In order to accelerate economic growth, the 
Indonesian Government has given priority to allocating investment to manufacturing as it 
was considered to produced greater value added.  In the period 1985–1990, FDI levels 
were higher than domestic investment but after 1990, FDI shrunk to levels below that of 
domestic investment.   
 
A striking feature of East Java’s manufacturing sector is the minor role played by foreign 
investment, which by and large, has tended to flow to other regions in Indonesia (Dick et 
al 1993).  Table 4 shows that FDI and domestic investment is concentrated in Jakarta and 
West Java.  On average, over the period 1985–2001, 15 per cent of Indonesia’s FDI was 
invested in the Jakarta region.  If both Jakarta and West Java are considered together, FDI 
invested amounted to 45 percent of national FDI. 
                                                                                                                                                 
manufacturing industry. 
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Table 4. Approved total investments (FDI and domestic) by selected provinces (per cent) 
 
  N Sumatera Jakarta West Java Yogyakarta Central Java East Java Others Indonesia 
FDI         
1985-1990 2.8 16.5 36.7 0.0 9.2 8.7 26.1 100.0 
1990-1996 2.0 14.6 29.1 0.2 4.8 17.6 31.7 100.0 
1996-2001 4.0 14.7 24.1 0.1 9.9 8.6 38.6 100.0 
 3.0 15.3 30.0 0.1 8.0 11.6 32.0 100.0 
Domestic         
1985-1990 2.4 7.0 42.2 0.7 7.4 6.8 33.5 100.0 
1990-1996 26 12.9 29.8 0.5 7.3 8.4 38.5 100.0 
1996-2001 2.2 9.9 21.7 0.2 3.5 6.7 55.8 100.0 
 2.4 9.9 31.2 0.4 6.1 7.3 42.7 100.0 
Total         
1985-1990 2.5 9.3 40.8 0.5 7.8 7.3 31.8 100.0 
1990-1996 2.3 13.6 29.5 0.4 6.2 12.3 35.7 100.0 
1996-2001 3.2 12.5 23.1 0.1 7.0 7.8 46.3 100.0 
  2.7 11.8 31.1 0.3 7.0 9.1 38.0 100.0 
Source: The Bank of Indonesia, Indonesian Financial Statistics, serial publication. 
 
Investment has not been evenly allocated within the province.  Between 1968 and 
November 2002, 81 per cent (Rp 56 trillion) of domestic investment was allocated to six 
regions in East Java, namely Surabaya, Gresik, Sidoarjo, Mojokerto, Malang, and 
Pasuruan.  Some 63 per cent of FDI (US$ 20.9 billion) was also channelled into those 
regions. 
 
Although most industrial estates in the Surabaya region are geared to the domestic 
market, several produce goods for export.  For example, at the Ngoro Industrial Park 
(NIP) located southwest of Surabaya, PT Indonesia Trisembilan produces cigar tobacco 
filler under the Villiger brand for export to its parent company, Philip Morris in Europe.  
The company is a US$ 15 million Dutch-Singaporean joint venture and is the biggest 
single investment at NIP.  NIP has a diverse set of resident industries – ranging from 
Taiwanese aluminium and semi-processed metals manufacturers exporting to markets in 
European to a South Korean firm producing electric guitars for the US market.  More 
Korean firms are expected to set up in NIP. 
 
Japanese, Korean and Taiwanese firms located at NIP do not regard themselves as 
footloose industries.  They claim to be committed to remaining in East Java because of 
what they perceive to be the provinces’ relatively quiescent labour environment, 
particularly after enactment of the 2000 Trade Union Act.  Like other manufacturing 
industries in East Java, however, foreign ventures in industrial estates in the Surabaya 
region are wary of changing regulations laid down by provincial and sub-provincial 
agencies and the impact of Labour Law 13 of 2003. 
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In 2002, East Java’s exports were worth around US$ 5 billion and made up 60% of East 
Java’s GRDP (BPS figures Oct 2002).  Exports are concentrated on two primary markets: 
Japan (24%) and the United States (16%).  As Table 5 suggests, the output of East Java’s 
manufacturing industry is mainly directed to the domestic market with export-orientated 
production confined to the textile, clothing and footwear and furniture industries.  As 
demand in global markets for these products has slowed in the face of increasing 
competition from other exporting nations in Asia, there has been a corresponding decline 
in the share manufactured exports make to East Java’s GRDP. 
 
Table 5. Composition of exports, East Java, 2002 
 
East Java Jakarta-West JavaCommodity Group 
US$ Millions % US$ Millions % 
     
 Primary 700 13.10 1,559 7.03 
Coffee, rubber, 
tobacco, tea 108 2.02 89 0.40 
Seafoods 411 7.69 118 0.53 
Other Primary 182 3.40 1,352 6.10 
     
Manufactures 4,567 85.47 19,510 88.01 
Food, drink, tobacco 476 8.91 531 2.39 
Textiles, clothing, 
footwear 447 8.37 6,826 30.79 
Plywood 154 2.88 134 0.60 
Paper & paperboard 745 13.94 721 3.25 
Furniture 221 4.13 220 0.99 
Chemicals, 
Pharmaceuticals, 
plastics 1,181 22.10 1,983 8.94 
Metals & Machinery 163 3.05 1,824 8.23 
Electronics Equipment 103 1.92 4,279 19.30 
Other and unspecified 1,077 20.16 2,992 13.50 
     
Total non-oil 5,267 98.57 21,070 95.04 
Oil 76 1.43 1,100 4.96 
     
Total 5,343 100.00 22,169 100.00 
Source: BPS, Indonesia Foreign Trade Statistics 2002, calculated by authors 
 
Why West and not East Java 
 
Manufacturing industry in Central Java and Yogyakarta has grown steadily but remains 
behind manufacturing in Jakarta/West Java and East Java, especially in terms of its 
contribution to GDP and value added per worker.  Manufacturing in Central Java shares 
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certain common characteristics with manufacturing in West and East Java: as in West 
Java, a strong textiles industry may be found and, as in East Java, a significant kretek 
cigarette industry is evident.  The common features of manufacturing within the three 
provinces reflect the historical development of the textile and kretek industries.  The 
production of traditional textiles using handloom technology was pioneered in West Java 
before moving to other parts of Java whereas the manufacture of kretek cigarettes, having 
originated in Central Java, in particular the Kudus region, later spread to other provinces. 
(Sumarno and Kuncoro, 2003) 
 
Why did Jakarta/West Java rather than East Java grow to be the leading manufacturing 
region in Indonesia?  It might be assumed that Jakarta, as the national capital city, 
possessed every necessary attribute to support a developing economy: skilled labour 
(many university graduates went to Jakarta together with other job-seekers), a capital 
market, transportation and communication networks, a seaport, airport, banking system, 
and central government.  Most foreign and domestic investment was allocated to this 
region.  Between 60 and 70 per cent of Indonesia’s money supply circulated in the 
Jakarta megalopolis4.  When industry in the Special Capital Region (DKI) needed more 
space for new factories, it relocated to West Java where sufficient amounts of greenfield 
sites remained available, for example in the Cikarang industrial estate.  In terms of 
employment, Jakarta/West Java’s share of the national labour force varied between 60 
and 65 per cent over a long period of time.  And because Jakarta/West Java possessed the 
physical infrastructure to access international trade routes, this ‘growth pole’ recorded 
faster growth than other regions. 
 
The attributes described in the preceding paragraph gave Jakarta/West Java an important 
advantage in developing its manufacturing sector.  In the pre-Reformasi era centralisation 
of government was the norm in Indonesia and as the seat of national government Jakarta 
had the final word in deciding development policies.  The second quotation at the 
beginning of this paper provides an interesting insight on the possible causes for 
Jakarta/West Java’s significantly stronger manufacturing industry profile in comparison 
with other regions of Indonesia. 
 
West Java received substantial amounts of foreign and domestic investment. This helps to 
explain why the province’s economy grew more rapidly than that of East Java.  
Manufacturing industry developed significantly and, based on Indonesian Central Bureau 
of Statistics figures5, employment creation in manufacturing tripled within 16 years (1986 
to 2002) from 670,000 to 2.1 million people. (see Appendix Table A1 and A2).  West 
Java’s performance may thus be considered highly creditable.  Although afflicted by the 
crisis in 1998, recovery in West Java after the crisis was rapid; by 1999, the level of 
employment creation was already higher than in the pre-crisis period. 
 
                                                 
4 This estimate is based on discussion at various seminars on the Indonesian economy attended by the 
authors.  The Bank of Indonesia has not officially commented on the subject. 
5 Drawn from Worker/Employees Situation in Indonesia (SAKERNAS) published by the Central Bureau 
of Statistics (BPS)  
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East Java also lagged behind West Java in manufacturing for export (refer Table 5), a 
factor that probably accounts for West Java’s more rapid growth in comparison with East 
Java.  East Java manufacturing industry was concentrated in food, beverages, and 
tobacco, which, by and large, were consumed in the domestic market.  Goods 
manufactured in Jakarta and West Java, principally textiles, chemicals and chemical by-
products, motor vehicles and trailers, other transport equipment, and electronics, were 
mainly items for export.  Although East Java diversified its production of manufactured 
goods, the province chiefly supplied industry inputs for the domestic market; for 
example, wood and wood products, paper and paper products and chemicals.  Much 
heavy industry in East Java produces semi-processed manufactures for large-scale 
domestic industry.  By way of illustration, paint producers throughout Indonesia use 
intermediate materials manufactured at the Gresik plant of East Java chemical company, 
PT PETRO WIDADA6. 
 
Despite its central role in national policy-making, Jakarta’s rate of increase in 
manufacturing employment was not as high as West Java’s.  East Java’s experience with 
manufacturing employment was different again.  In percentage, as well as in absolute 
value terms, employment decreased in 1996, two years before the peak of the crisis. Even 
though manufacturing employment increased in East Java after 1999, the growth rate was 
not as steep as that in West Java. 
 
Employment, Wages and Value-Added 
 
Table 6 demonstrates a sixfold increase in the number of workers in Indonesia employed 
in manufacturing between 1975 and 2000.  During that period, all provinces absorbed 
additional workers as a consequence of economic growth.  In Jakarta/West Java, the 
number of workers employed, as a proportion of the total national workforce, increased 
steadily from 32.78 per cent in 1975 to 47.18 per cent in 2000.  Over the same time 
frame, other provinces experienced a decline in the numbers of workers employed despite 
an overall increase in the total number of workers employed in Indonesia. 
 
By deflating for estimated consumer price index (CPI), real MVA per worker in 
Jakarta/West Java tripled within 25 years, while in East Java real MVA per worker 
quadrupled.  In other provinces MVA per worker doubled or even tripled in magnitude. 
  
Before the financial crisis, manufacturing industry in Indonesia experienced strong 
growth but at the peak of the crisis in 1997-1998 it suffered a marked deterioration in 
comparison with other sectors of the economy.  At that time, manufacturing activity 
appeared to pause as if to allow absorption of Indonesia’s abundant labour force. 
Commencing in 1999/2000, manufacturing production began to pick up once more 
although it did not regain its earlier momentum. 
 
Two important phenomena are worth noting here.  Firstly, value added per worker in 
Jakarta is significantly higher than in other manufacturing provinces.  Secondly, Table 7 
                                                 
6 PT Petro Widada’s Gresik factory exploded in February 2004 with disastrous consequences, including 
loss of life. 
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illustrates the comparative average monthly wages of production workers in selected 
Indonesian provinces.  The monthly wages of workers in the Jakarta-Bogor-Tanggerang-
Bekasi (JABOTABEK) region are evidently higher than in other regions.  
 
Table 6. Comparison of the numbers of workers and value added/worker (per cent).  Large 
&Medium manufacturing industry in selected provinces 
 
Province 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 
Number of workers       
North Sumatera 3.21 3.86 5.28 6.29 4.48 3.82 
Jakarta/West Java 32.78 36.98 37.07 42.96 45.85 47.18 
Yogyakarta 2.15 1.61 1.04 0.88 0.82 0.97 
Central Java 23.46 19.00 16.04 13.69 12.73 13.41 
East Java 30.67 28.21 24.48 20.44 22.81 19.97 
Others 7.73 10.34 16.09 15.74 13.31 14.65 
Indonesia (%) 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Indonesia (people) 698,244 979,919 1,684,726 2,662,804 4,174,141 4,366,816
Value-added/worker at constant prices (1975) (Rp. thousands) 
North Sumatera 842 1,627 1,809 1,899 2,589 2,393 
Jakarta/West Java 1,051 1,802 2,166 2,418 2,965 3,620 
Yogyakarta 327 843 700 1,006 1,394 1,274 
Central Java 616 1,049 1,428 2,236 1,336 1,213 
East Java 785 1,607 1,649 2,099 2,711 3,513 
Indonesia 843 1,571 1,883 2,263 2,632 3,205 
Source: BPS, Statistics Indonesia – Medium and Large Manufacturing Survey – calculated by author.  
Constant prices were calculated by estimated the increase in annual inflation (1975 – 1997 = 10%; 1998 = 
80%; and 1999 – 2000 = 10%). 
 
Table 7. Average nominal wages of manufacturing production workers (Rp.000) 
 
Regions 20011) 20022)
W Java, Jakarta, Banten 708.85 849.57 
Jabotabek 737.55 922.13 
C Java & Yogyakarta 330.85 410.57 
East Java & Bali 469.95 543.83 
Sugresid 559.95 627.87 
Source: BPS, Statistics Indonesia: Statistical year-book of Indonesia 2002:  
1) Average of quarter III and IV 2) Average of quarter I up to III 
 
The preceding paragraphs highlight Indonesia’s employment problems during the crisis.  
In the period 1996-1998, the number of workers employed in manufacturing decreased as 
a whole in Indonesia7.  In three provinces (Jakarta, East Java, and North Sumatra) 
employment in manufacturing decreased significantly (Chart 1).  However, immediately 
following the crisis in 1998-2000, the number of workers in manufacturing employment 
                                                 
7 Without conducting a full survey, it may be assumed that employment in Indonesia underwent a shift 
from the formal to informal sector.  This assumption is supported by the dearth of social security benefits 
available to workers in Indonesia.  The shift from formal to informal employment may be an interesting 
topic for further research. 
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increased in West Java, Central Java and Yogyakarta.  Only in North Sumatra was there a 
decrease in manufacturing employment.  
 
Chart 1. Manufacturing Employment 1990-2000
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In terms of employment in manufacturing, West Java performed better than other 
provinces.  In the pre-crisis period, a significant amount of new employment was created 
in West Java.  Manufacturing employment growth in this province in fact increased 
during the crisis (1997-1998).  In the economic recovery period (1998-2000), West Java’s 
manufacturing employment continued to increase.  This pattern of employment growth 
did not occur in East Java.  Jakarta and East Java experienced a rapid decrease in 
employment during the crisis and did not recover quickly.  Overall, the combined record 
of employment in manufacturing in Jakarta/West Java was a fairly good one. 
 
Variation in constant-price MVA per worker between provinces appears to be caused by 
differences in the structure of manufacturing industry within each province (APPENDIX 
Table A3). Most employment in manufacturing in North Sumatra and East Java is 
concentrated in the production of ISIC 31 category goods (food, beverages, and tobacco), 
where output is commodity-based.  This is true particularly in East Java where the most 
labour-intensive industry is kretek cigarette manufacturing.  By way of contrast, textile 
and garment products are significant in West Java.  Historically, investment was attracted 
to the Majalaya district near Bandung where textiles were produced using ATBM (Alat 
Tenun Bukan Mesin – manual weaving) techniques.  Heavy industry, such as ISIC 34 
(fabricated metal products, machinery and equipment), was concentrated in Jakarta/West 
Java. 
 
As discussed earlier, possession of different types of manufacturing industry advantaged 
Jakarta.  The availability of supplies of skilled labour and investment allowed Jakarta to 
develop a motor vehicle and transport equipment industry, rather than relying entirely on 
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foodstuff or tobacco manufacture.  In West Java, on the other hand, inputs of skilled 
labour gradually transformed the province’s existing traditional textile industry into one 
using more sophisticated manufacturing techniques.  While both Jakarta and West Java 
produced transport equipment, West Java specialised in bus chassis manufacture. 
  
III. MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY ‘WINNERS AND LOSERS’ 
 
As noted above, East Java as a whole has not performed well in manufacturing in recent 
years.  In the pre-crisis period, 1993-1997, the proportion of manufacturing in East Java 
compared to that of Indonesia as a whole increased from 16.8 to 17.5 per cent. However, 
with the onset of the crisis in 1997-1998, the proportion of manufacturing in East Java 
began to shrink until it attained only 13.7 percent in 2000 (Chart 2).  
 
Chart 2. Percentage of manufacturing industry to GDP in East Java 
compared with Indonesia - 1993-2000 (Constant prices 1993)
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Although the proportion of GDP in East Java remained unchanged over the period, at 
around 14 percent, the crisis may be regarded as a turning point in East Java’s industrial 
development.  What are the reasons for this?  Firstly, East Java remained reliant on only 
one category of manufactures; namely, food, beverages, and tobacco (ISIC 31).  
Secondly, manufacturing industry in other provinces was more diversified.  The final 
reason, which seems no less important than the other two, is that development of physical 
infrastructure in East Java did not spread evenly throughout all the province’s regencies 
and municipalities. Particular regions, such as the region known as SUGRESID (ie 
Surabaya, Gresik and Sidoarjo) experienced faster rates of growth than other regions that 
continued to suffer from weak infrastructure. 
 
The present make-up of manufacturing in East Java reflects a growing divergence 
between those industries that are performing well (the ‘winners’) and those that appear to 
have declined in importance in recent years (the ‘losers’).  Amongst the winners one 
finds food-processing ventures that continue to record strong export growth.  One 
example is PT Pangan Lestari, part of Sekar Group, which is one of East Java’s leading 
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food processing ventures.  Thirty to forty per cent of PT Pangan Lestari’s principal food 
lines are exported, mainly to Korea, Japan, Europe and New Zealand.  The main products 
exported are breaded shrimp (15 containers a month) and prawn crackers (5-10 
containers).  Ninety per cent of breaded shrimp product goes to Japan.  Another ‘winner’ 
growth industry in East Java is electronics. The removal of ‘luxury’ tax from electronics 
goods in January 2003 is likely to benefit East Java electronics manufacturers, for 
example, PT Maspion.  But the electronics industry is footloose and could easily move to 
another country if investors are unhappy about business conditions. 
 
Among less successful industries that have not maintained earlier promise (the ‘losers’) 
are the leather processing and footwear industries that are centred in Sidoarjo and 
Mojokerto.  Footwear manufacturers are concentrated in Mojokerto while leather bags 
are concentrated in Sidoarjo.  According to the Indonesian Footwear Association, by the 
end of 2002, up to 10 manufacturers had left East Java to re-establish overseas on the 
grounds that rising costs made their products uncompetitive  (Kompas-East Java Edition, 
1 November 2002). 
 
The leather footwear industry in East Java claims that producers in China and Vietnam 
have undermined their competitive position and that exports to Hong Kong and 
Singapore have fallen dramatically.  The footwear industry has also had to face the 
impact of Law 13 of 2003, which governs employee dismissal provisions, worker 
severance payments, and labour strikes.  The industry claims the new law has negatively 
affected its productivity.  PT Panen Raya, a leather footwear manufacturer based in 
Sidoarjo, typifies the problems.  The company closed six of its seven factories in the 
Surabaya region in 2002, including its largest manufacturing unit in Sidorjo, and by early 
2003 operated only one factory.  PT Panen Raya is unwilling to work with other 
established footwear manufacturers in East Java, for example PT Victory Long Age 
Indonesia, citing an inability to trust other East Java producers. 
 
Furniture manufacturing has suffered a similar decline.  Bojonegoro and Pasuruan are the 
main centres for teak furniture production.  In recent years, the industry in Pasuruan has 
suffered because of rising raw material prices – sixty per cent more than the Perhutani 
forestry company basic price.  Rising timber prices have both reduced the number of 
craftsmen fashioning furniture in Pasuruan, in comparison with the number of furniture 
traders, and led to a decline in the quality of finished furniture.8
 
The burgeoning oil and gas sector in East Java offers potential opportunities for local 
manufacturers.  Two natural gas projects that will create foreign investment, 
infrastructure development and employment opportunities in East Java are the Tuban 
deposit and the Oyong field located in the Sampang Production Sharing Contract zone.  
East Java manufacturers producing and supplying mining equipment and consumable 
items stand to gain from future development of the province’s natural resources. 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 Regional Economic Development Institute (2002) 
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The Locational Dimension of Manufacturing in East Java 
 
Dick et al (1993) and Dick (2002) contend that while Surabaya was the original 
manufacturing city in East Java, rapid industrial growth created a Surabaya–Malang 
corridor.  Dick labelled this corridor, the Pita Pembangunan (the ribbon of development).  
Like Dick, Kuncoro’s (2001) analysis of the East Java business sector located the main 
concentration of manufacturing in East Java in what he called Extended Surabaya.  
Actually, the area defined by Dick and Kuncoro is very similar: it comprises Surabaya as 
its core, and includes those regencies possessing superior physical infrastructure; namely, 
the area surrounding Surabaya (Gresik, Sidoarjo, Malang, Pasuruan, and Mojokerto).  
Surabaya’s quality transport infrastructure assets consist of: the road tollway connecting 
Tanjung Perak seaport to Gresik and Pandaan (Pasuruan); Juanda International Airport 
near Sidoarjo; a major highway connecting Sidoarjo to Mojokerto and Kertosono (under 
construction); and a highway to Pasuruan.   
 
Manufacturing is found not only concentrated in the Surabaya–Malang corridor (Pita 
Pembangunan), but also spreading to Gresik, Pasuruan, Sidoarjo, and Mojokerto.  In this 
respect, the Pita Pembangunan has widened over time.  Following the development of 
infrastructure and the physical requirements of individual factory sites, manufacturing in 
East Java spread to Pasuruan, Mojokerto, and even to Kertosono (Nganjuk).  
 
East Java’s regional economic structure suggests there are benefits in examining its 
manufacturing profile based on geographic zones.  This would seem to be a more simple 
approach than, for example, describing manufacturing in each of the province’s 37 
regencies and municipalities (Table 8). 
 
Table 8.  East Java Zones and their regencies/municipalities 
 
Western Zone Central Zone Eastern Zone 
01. Pacitan (R) 
02. Ponorogo (R) 
03. Trenggalek (R) 
04. Tulungagung (R) 
05. Blitar (R) 
06. Kediri (R) 
07. Jombang (R) 
08. Nganjuk (R) 
09. Madiun (R) 
10. Magetan (R) 
11. Ngawi (R) 
12. Bojonegoro (R) 
13. Tuban (R) 
14. Lamongan (R) 
15. Kediri (M) 
16. Blitar (M) 
17. Madiun (M) 
01. Surabaya (M) 
02. Malang (R) 
03. Malang (M) 
04. Gresik (R) 
05. Sidoarjo (R) 
06. Mojokerto (R) 
07. Mojokerto (M) 
08. Pasuruan (R) 
09. Pasuruan (M) 
01. Probolinggo (R) 
02. Probolinggo (M) 
03. Lumajang (R) 
04. Bondowoso (R) 
05. Situbondo (R) 
06. Jember (R) 
07. Banyuwangi (R) 
08. Bangkalan (R) 
09. Sampang (R) 
10. Pamekasan (R) 
11. Sumenep (R) 
 
 
R = regencies 
M = municipalities 
 
In 1996, at the conclusion of the pre-crisis period of rapid growth, East Java’s Central 
Zone occupied the most significant place in the provincial economy.  Fifty-three per cent 
of the province’s economic output - based on GRDP (Gross Regional Domestic Product) 
– and thirty-six per cent of East Java’s manufacturing industry originated in this region. 
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The Western Zone also played an important role in the provincial economy, viz. thirty per 
cent of manufacturing value added (MVA).  Despite the disparity in area and population 
between the Eastern and Central Zones (the former being greater in both respects than the 
latter), the economic significance of the Eastern Zone was much smaller.
 
As Indonesia’s “second biggest” province, East Java boasts a significant variety of 
manufacturing, especially in small-medium enterprises.  For example, in Banyuwangi, 
originally a predominantly agriculture-based regency, medium industry has developed 
quickly in recent years, especially in the production of articles supporting tourism in Bali.  
Pacitan, one of the most isolated areas of the province, is developing a souvenir 
manufacturing industry, for example in precious stone working, as a means of stimulating 
tourism.  Tulungagung has developed its own areas of specialisation; as an exporter of 
garments to Africa, and manufacturer of marble.  Most Javanese people know that high-
quality, affordable leather goods are made in Tanggulangin, Sidoarjo, mostly for export.  
And people who travel from Surabaya to Bali by bus will be aware of how many different 
types of snacks and prawn crackers vendors sell along the way.  By and large, small-
medium manufacturing enterprise in East Java possesses specific and innovative skills 
supporting business development.  Small-medium manufacturers producing for both the 
domestic and international markets enjoy strong competitive advantages.  As a result, in 
line with an increase in Indonesia’s overall labour force, the proportion of workers 
employed in small-medium manufacturing in Indonesia is increasing. 
  
The foregoing provides useful background for a discussion of the locational dimension of 
manufacturing in East Java.  Although the Western and Central Zones make a major 
contribution to manufacturing in the province, this does not appear to be the case if 
looked at from a manufacturing structure perspective.  The Western Zone has performed 
well in manufacturing, but this has been achieved through a heavy reliance on a single 
product (cigarettes), whereas the Central Zone produces a more diversified range of 
manufactured goods (see Table 9).  
 
Table 9. Distribution of East Java’s economy by zones and sectors – 2001 
 
Zones 
Central Sectors Western 
 SUGRESID Others 
Eastern 
 
East 
Java 
 
Agriculture 6.91 1.23 2.79 8.44 19.37 
Mfg. Industry 9.29 15.81 3.84 1.43 30.37 
   Cigarettes 8.64 3.88 1.70 0.07 14.28 
   Mfg. Industry other than Cigarettes 0.65 11.93 2.14 1.36 16.08 
Others 11.73 22.89 7.65 8.00 50.27 
Total 27.93 39.93 14.27 17.87 100.00 
 
The argument presented here benefits from a more detailed analysis of manufacturing 
industry divided between the three principal locational zones, with particular emphasis on 
numbers of workers employed and manufacturing value added. 
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East Java’s thirty-seven regencies and municipalities differ enormously in size (as 
measured by population, worker skill levels, area, the structure of manufacturing industry 
and infrastructure).  All these factors contribute to the diversity found among the 
province’s regencies and municipalities.  For example, Banyuwangi in the Eastern Zone 
is the largest regency in terms of area (5,783 km2) with a population of 1.6 million 
people (4.5 per cent of the East Java total).  Located near Bali, Banyuwangi achieved a 
GRDP of only Rp 5.16 trillion in 2001, of which a mere 5.15 per cent was derived from 
manufacturing.  Neighbouring Jember, with a marginally bigger economy than 
Banyuwangi, produced just 7.59 per cent of East Java’s manufacturing output in the same 
year.  In terms of area and population, Sidoarjo in the Central Zone is much smaller than 
Banyuwangi.  However, Sidoarjo achieved a GRDP of Rp 12.46 trillion in 2001, with 
manufacturing contributing 52.36 per cent of the total.  At the other end of the scale, 
Pacitan (on the edge of the Western Zone and close to Central Java) has a small GRDP of 
less than Rp 1 trillion of which only 3.6 per cent comes from manufacturing, particularly 
the handicraft production of precious stones.  
 
As noted above, the Central Zone, with only 13 per cent of the area and 30 per cent of the 
population of the province is the dominant zone in East Java.  The manufacturing sector 
in the Central Zone employs 70 per cent of the province’s labour force, creates around 70 
per cent value-added and produces more than 75 per cent of its economic output.  
Compared with the East Java economy as a whole, the Central Zone produced 56 per cent 
of the province’s GRDP. 
 
Based on two variables (value added and employment), manufacturing industry in 2000 
was concentrated in the Western and Central Zones, especially in the SUGRESID region 
(Table 10).  Manufacturing accounted for more than 76 per cent of the Central Zone’s 
output (Rp 86 trillion) and 19.1 per cent of output in the Western Zone.  Manufacturing 
accounted for only a small proportion of the Eastern Zone’s output (less than 5 per cent). 
Manufacturing value-added seems somewhat differently distributed within the province 
but is clearly concentration heavily in the two Central and Western Zones.  The Central 
Zone accounts for more than 70 per cent of the province’s value-added and the Western 
Zone account for almost 34 per cent. However, if employment is considered, a more 
‘even’ distribution is evident.  The percentage of workers employed in the three zones 
was 16.8; 70,1; and 12.6 per cent respectively. 
 
At the two peripheries of the province (ie the Western and Eastern Zones), around 70 per 
cent of workers were employed in ISIC 31 (food, beverages, and tobacco) industry.  
However in the Central Zone, the same ISIC industry category accounted for only 25 per 
cent of all manufacturing employment.  Around 16 per cent of employment in the Central 
Zone was taken up by ISIC 35 (chemical, petroleum, coal, rubber, and plastic products) 
industry.  The reasons for this pattern appear clear-cut.  Food, beverages, and tobacco 
appear concentrated in the Western Zone, whereas the Central Zone houses a 
concentration of heavy industries, such as chemical and plastics and related by-products. 
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Table 10. Comparison of employment and manufacturing value-added 
 
  Employment (thousands) Employment (%) 
C. Zone C. Zone ISIC 
Code 
W. Zone 
 SUGRESID Others 
E. Zone
  
Total 
  
W. Zone 
  SUGRESID Others 
E. Zone 
  
Total 
  
31 105 77 78 74 335 71.6 18.6 39.1 67.1 38.4
32 11 78 35 7 132 7.3 18.8 17.7 6.8 15.1
33 14 52 29 8 103 9.4 12.5 14.5 7.1 11.8
34 3 33 9 5 50 2.1 8.0 4.4 4.7 5.8
35 5 75 25 11 117 3.4 18.2 12.5 10.2 13.4
36 5 24 4 3 36 3.3 5.7 2.1 2.7 4.1
37 0 10 2 0 12 0.0 2.4 1.0 0.0 1.4
38 3 59 13 1 76 1.8 14.3 6.6 0.9 8.7
39 1 6 4 1 13 1.0 1.5 2.2 0.5 1.4
Total 146 415 201 110 872 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
(%) 16.8 47.6 23.0 12.6 100.0      
  MVA (Rp Trillion) MVA (%) 
31 12.8 10.2 3.6 0.9 27.5 91.0 35.9 46.4 56.1 53.1
32 0.1 1.8 0.9 0.3 3.0 0.7 6.4 11.0 17.4 5.9
33 0.1 1.1 0.5 0.1 1.8 0.7 3.9 5.9 6.3 3.4
34 0.2 5.6 0.7 0.1 6.6 1.3 19.8 8.7 9.0 12.7
35 0.1 3.2 1.3 0.1 4.7 0.4 11.4 16.0 9.6 9.0
36 0.7 0.9 0.2 0.0 1.7 4.8 3.1 2.1 0.8 3.3
37 0.0 2.9 0.2 0.0 3.2 0.0 10.3 2.9 0.0 6.1
38 0.1 2.2 0.5 0.0 2.9 1.0 7.9 6.0 0.4 5.5
39 0.0 0.4 0.1 0.0 0.5 0.2 1.3 1.0 0.3 0.9
Total 14.1 28.3 7.9 1.5 51.8 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
(%) 27.2 54.7 15.2 3.0 100.0           
 
2-digit ISIC (International Standard for Industrial Classification) codes 
31 Food, beverages, and tobacco       
32 Textiles, garments, and leathers     
33 Wood, bamboo, rattan, willow and the like, including furniture 
34 Paper and paper products, printing and publishing   
35 Chemical, petroleum, coal, rubber, and plastic products   
36 Nonmetallic mineral products, except products of petroleum and coal 
37 Basic metal industries       
38 Fabricated metal products, machinery and equipments   
39 Other manufacturing industries         
 
 
 
 18
The Dominance of Kretek Manufacturing 
 
In terms of the distribution of 3-digit ISIC groups, each zone shows a slight variation, as 
is evident in Table 11.  Measured against employment and value-added, ISIC 314 
(processed tobacco and cigarette flavours) industry is dominant in the Western and 
Central Zones.  In the Western Zone, value-added ISIC 314 increased sharply from 56 
per cent in 1975 to more than 85 per cent in 1980, although in 1980-2000, ISIC 314 
value-added remained stable.  ISIC 314 remained the dominant ISIC ranking in the 
Central Zone but its share of employment and value-added decreased gradually.  This 
decrease was matched, however, by an increasing in the importance of other major ISIC 
groups in the Central Zone, for example textile manufacturing.  This transition 
differentiated the Central and Western Zones.  The Western Zone retained a high 
proportion of resource-based industry, for example cigarette production. 
 
Tobacco and cigarette processing is important in Kediri, located in East Java’s Western 
Zone.  Very small in area, Kediri recorded a GRDP of Rp16.4 trillion in 2001, of which 
78.27 per cent derived from manufacturing.  The main industry in Kediri is kretek 
cigarette production and the dominant producer is PT Gudang Garam.  Since the 1990s, 
the company is believed to be the largest cigarette producer in Indonesia (Sumarno and 
Kuncoro, 2003) and Indonesia’s highest corporate taxpayer (McMichael, 1997).  In the 
absence of production from Gudang Garam’s ‘giant’ cigarette factory, Kediri’s GRDP 
was estimated to have amounted to only Rp3.9 trillion in 2001.   
 
In comparison with the Western Zone, the Central Zone possesses a much higher 
concentration of modern heavy industry.  However, kretek manufacturing also features in 
the Central Zone where there is also a sizable kretek factory owned by PT HM 
Sampoerna.  Other than the big two kretek producers, there are hundreds of medium-
sized kretek factories, for instance the Reco Pentung factory in Tulungagung.  Kretek 
cigarette factories are located throughout the Western and Central Zones increasing their 
share of East Java’s labour force employed and value-added. 
 
Table 11. The dominant 3-digit ISIC groups in the Western and Central Zones, 1980 and 
2000 (%) 
 
3-digit 1980 2000 
ISIC Western Zone Central Zone Western Zone Central Zone 
  Employment MVA Employment MVA Employment MVA Employment MVA 
314 56.8 85.3 19.7 33.5 48.5 85.0 13.2 21.4 
311 28.3 12.4 14.5 11.7 18.9 5.4 7.3 9.1 
312 1.6 0.2 4.7 1.9 4.0 0.5 4.2 7.1 
321 4.9 0.6 14.3 6.4 1.8 0.1 4.8 3.0 
341 0.8 0.1 1.8 0.9 1.9 1.3 5.1 16.6 
352 0.4 0.2 7.0 5.7 0.8 0.1 3.2 3.9 
Others 7.2 1.3 38.0 39.9 24.2 7.5 62.3 39.0 
 
314 Processed tobacco and cigarette flavours;                  311/312: Food and beverages 
321 Textiles;   341: Paper, paper products, and the like;   352: Other Chemicals 
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Light and Heavy Industry 
 
Light manufacturing comprises mainly production of basic consumer goods while and 
heavy industry consists of the production of industrial supplies, intermediate 
manufactured goods and sophisticated consumer goods (Kirkpatrick, Lee, and Nixon 
1984:17). In East Java, a large number of firms, ranging from small-medium to large 
manufacturing enterprises, occupy the major 3-digit ISIC industry groups.  ISIC 311 
(food and beverages) is next in importance after processed tobacco and cigarettes in the 
Western Zone, and considered significant (in terms of its share of employment and value-
added) in the Central and Eastern Zones.   
   
As the East Java economy has grown, the demand on heavy industries to produce 
intermediate and capital goods for industry has increased.  The structure of East Java 
industry between 1980 and 2000, based on broad categories of ‘light’ and ‘heavy’ 
industry, can be seen in Appendix Table A4.  The data shows that in the pre-crisis period, 
manufacturing in East Java relied heavily on light industry with heavy industry 
occupying only a small place in the province’s industry make-up. 
  
Beside light industry products such as cigarettes and food, the production of paper and 
paper goods (ISIC 341) representing ‘heavy’ industry, has increased dramatically.  
Historically, this sort of manufacturing was located in Probolinggo at the state-owned 
Kertas Letjes factory.  As manufacturing industry has developed in East Java, new 
productive plants in this major ISIC group have appeared, mostly in the Central Zone.  
PT Tjiwi Kimia in Sidoarjo is one example.  Privately owned factories producing paper 
products were also set up in Surabaya, Gresik and Sidoarjo.  
 
Despite a long-term decline in its share of manufacturing during the twentieth century, 
light industry remained the leading industry category in 2000.  At the same time, in 
comparison with other zones, the Central Zone retained a high proportion of heavy 
industry, as can be seen in Table 12. 
 
As discussed above, the division of East Java into three principal zones is based on the 
spatial distribution of manufacturing among 37 regencies and municipalities.  By 
regressing9 independent variables for the years from 1975 to 2001 and calculating the 
dependent variables of employment, value-added, and output as a percentage for the 
whole province, the coefficient of regression in terms of employment β was 0.873 and R² 
was 0.933; for value-added, β was 0.851 and R² was 0.720; and for output β was 1.051 
and R² was 0.947.  The results all approximate 1, and are highly significant with a high 
R².  This indicates a long-term concentration of manufacturing in the Central Zone from 
before the Asian financial crisis through to the post-crisis period.  
 
                                                 
9 The three similar regressions are εβα ÷+= XY  where β is a coefficient of regression with X = year 1975, α 
= year 2001 and Y = percentage of employment absorbed in the Central Zone; in the second and third, Y is applied to 
value added and output respectively.  
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Table 12.  The structure of East Java’s manufacturing value added (MVA) by 
zones, 1980,1985, 1990, 1995, 2000, at current prices 
 
Zones  1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 
Light Industry      
Western  38.8 34.8 35.9 32.8 25.2 
Central  33.2 30.6 32.9 33.6 38.7 
Eastern  5.3 6.7 4.7 2.8 2.5 
  77.3 72.1 73.5 69.2 66.4 
Heavy Industry      
Western  0.3 0.6 0.8 1.5 2.0 
Central  20.8 24.7 23.9 28.8 31.1 
Eastern  1.5 2.6 1.9 0.5 0.5 
  22.7 27.9 26.5 30.8 33.6 
East Java  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
(Rp trillion)  0.7 1.8 4.8 17.4 51.8 
 
A multiple discriminant analysis (MDA)10 was used to test for a three-way breakdown of 
industry zones in East Java , featuring the employment coefficient of specialization, LQa, 
(the agriculture location quotient), and LQm (manufacturing industry location quotient).  
The analysis suggested that 64.8 per cent of the original grouped industry examples were 
correctly classified.  The result of the discriminant analysis was only fair.  Two factors 
accounted for this result.  Firstly, the Central Zone had access to relatively superior 
physical infrastructure, such as a major seaport, international airport, internodal 
highways, a sophisticated communication network and banking system.  The Western 
Zone had various endowments supplying raw materials, such as tobacco. Secondly, the 
Western and Eastern Zones are broadly similar in terms of the structure of their 
agriculture sector, and the Central Zone physically separates these two zones.  
 
                                                 
10 The MDA  formula is 332211 XWXWXWZ ++= , where X1 = employment coefficient of specialization of 37 
regencies/municipalities; X2 = LQ agriculture sector of 37 regencies/municipalities; X3 = LQ industrial sectors of 37 
regencies/municipalities. Coefficient of specialization (CS) is the simplest measure for determining the degree of 
diversification a set of industries within a certain region (regencies/municipalities). It is measured from a set of 
industries in a certain regency/municipality to a larger benchmark (the East Java province). CS is calculated by 
subtracting for each industry (3-digit ISIC), the percentage share of an industry in the East Java from the percentage 
share of the same industry in the certain regency/municipality. Then, either the positive or the negative differences are 
summed and divided by 100. CS varies from 0 (perfect diversification) to 1 (perfect specialization). As usually, the real 
value of CS is in between them. 
 The formula of LQ is: 
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i
NN
i
i XX
XX
LQ =    
XiR = output of sector i in province R; XR = total output in province R; XiN = output sector i of sub-province; XN = total 
output of sub-province. The data were calculated from sectoral GRDPs (Gross Domestic Regional Product) of all 37 
regencies/municipalities, but the stressed was only for two main sectors: agriculture and manufacture. These two were 
the biggest sector in the East Java. 
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IV.  EXPLANATIONS FOR THE PERFORMANCE OF EAST JAVA’S 
MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY  
 
A number of possible explanations may be adduced to account for the failure of East 
Java’s manufacturing industry to keep abreast of manufacturing in other Indonesian 
provinces, and become more diversified.  While not constituting an exhaustive list, 
several factors appear to have contributed to East Java’s laggard manufacturing sector: 
physical infrastructure constraints, a weak banking and investment climate, a narrow 
export base and government policy.  We discuss each in turn.  
 
Infrastructure 
  
Constraints on the capacity of East Java’s seaports, airports, road networks and power 
generation all appear to have affected the growth of manufacturing in the province.  East 
Java’s transport infrastructure is overwhelmingly concentrated in Surabaya - a 
consequence of the city’s long history and its role as a trading hub for the whole of 
eastern Indonesia.  However, Surabaya’s transport infrastructure suffers through lack of 
attention to upgrading and modernization.  East Java’s allocation of funds for provincial 
development is small in comparison to routine budget expenditure. 
A series of focus group discussions held in October 2003 by the World Bank with the 
private sector throughout East Java highlighted infrastructure as a significant business 
constraint.  Large enterprises identified poor road maintenance, difficult access to 
industrial estates, insufficient power supply and an expensive yet insufficient water 
supply as key infrastructure problems, while small businesses identified the negative 
impacts of traffic congestion on distribution and the need to supply their own captive 
power to compensate for the unreliable electricity supply.  (Jakarta Post - Opinion and 
Editorial, 1 September 2004). 
Seaports 
 
East Java’s principal maritime gateway is the port of Surabaya at Tanjung Perak.  
Siltation in the Madura Straits, which requires regular dredging, poses a major physical 
constraint to the port’s operational effectiveness.  The owners of the port, the Indonesian 
Port Corporation III, are overseeing a project, known as the Kali Lamong project, which 
involves deepening the Strait’s approach channel to 9 metres.   The Surabaya Container 
Port (TPS) however is not affected by siltation problems as it is located nearer the 
entrance to the approach channel. 
 
According to Ray and Blankfeld (2002), Tanjung Perak is located too close to its main 
competitor, the port of Jakarta at Tanjung Priok, to serve as an effective second trans-
shipment port in Indonesia.  Surabaya’s port is not efficient in comparison with Jakarta 
and faces difficulties in generating significant operating profit to allow the port to grow. 
Although Surabaya levies a competitive US$93 per vessel Terminal Handling Charge 
(THC), compared to US$150 THC in Jakarta, Surabaya port authorities believe they may 
need to impose supplementary levies on cargo throughput to generate sufficient revenue 
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to cover operating costs and make a profit.  The port of Lembar in Lombok has already 
introduced additional levies to increase income. 
 
TPS is about two-thirds the size of the Jakarta International Container Terminal (not 
counting the Koja extension).  In 2002, ninety ships a month called at TPS and the port 
handled one million TEU, demonstrating 8 per cent annual growth.  This was a good 
result, although the pre-crisis figure was 15 per cent annual growth.  The average ship 
capacity berthing at the Terminal is 1000 TEU.  The rail connection at TPS is not 
considered efficient with only 3 boxes being handled a day at the railhead.  Trucking is 
the only efficient means of delivery with road transport handling about 2,000 boxes a 
day. 
 
TPS has had only one tariff increase in the last five years.  TPS operator, P&O Australia, 
claims that TPS is competitive as its one-day berthing window is cheaper than Hong 
Kong and Japan while being comparable to Singapore.  Ray and Blankfeld argue that 
P&O paid a high price to obtain the concession to operate TPS and the company is 
required under the terms of its contract to make substantial annual payments to the port 
owners (the Indonesian Government).   P&O’s contractual obligations mean that the 
company has few incentives to pass on cost savings to users of the facility. 
 
Roads and Bridges 
 
Road traffic congestion is a growing impediment to the smooth flow of people and goods 
throughout East Java.  The East Java Development Planning Agency (BAPPEPROP) has 
proposed a five-point strategy for boosting the provincial economy that relies mainly on 
upgrading road and bridges.  The strategy calls for completion of the Surabaya-Madura 
Bridge; upgrading the southern arterial roadway; and construction of a Surabaya-
Mojokerto tollway. 
 
An October 2001 World Bank-funded study, the Java Arterial Road Network Study 
(JARNS), drew attention to growing traffic congestion in the region around Surabaya  
The study proposed upgrading the Probolinggo-Banyuwangi section of the Java Main 
Trunk Network to a minimum 7 metre width standard, although a four-lane road was 
considered not warranted.  JARNS found that private sector-funded toll roads would 
alleviate road traffic congestion.  Financially feasible tollways could be constructed 
between Gempol and Malang, Gempol and Pasaruan and Surabaya and Mojokerto, by 
2010 or 2015.  A further Surabaya Western Bypass toll road may be feasible by 2010.  
The JARNS study identified substantial private sector interest in possible toll roads, 
including an intra-city private sector-funded toll road in the City of Surabaya.   
 
After a prolonged delay, work has commenced on the SURAMADU Bridge connecting 
Surabaya with Madura.  The bridge is intended to reduce pressure on the existing ferry 
service and link new industrial sites on Madura to the mainland.  Construction, which is 
expected to be completed in 2006, commenced simultaneously on the Surabaya and 
Bangkalan sides of the Madura Strait.  Funding for the project comes from the central 
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government in the form of Special Purpose Grants (Dana Alokasi Khusus), Kuwaiti loans 
and from local investors. 
 
In contrast to existing and planned road arteries in the northern part of the province, road 
infrastructure along the south coast of East Java remains undeveloped.  In the first year of 
decentralization in 2001, 8 regencies (Pacitan, Trenggalek, Tulungagung, Blitar, Malang, 
Lumajang, Jember, and Banyuwangi) signed a memorandum of understanding on the 
development the southern part of the East Java. However the MOU has not resulted in 
any concrete projects to overcome the transport deficiencies in the area.  To develop the 
southern-part of East Java, improved transport infrastructure is required to facilitate 
distribution of raw material and manufacturing products within the southern regencies. 
For example, a modern canned tuna facility in Pasuruan (Central Zone) could source 
commodity inputs from the Southern Ocean. 
 
Airports 
 
Air transport infrastructure facilities have been slowly up-graded in recent years but 
remain below the standard that might be expected of Indonesia’s second city.  Passenger 
throughput at Surabaya’s Juanda Airport has fluctuated considerably since the Asian 
financial crisis.  Until 1997, Juanda airport (domestic and international) was handling in 
the vicinity of 70,000 aircraft a year (arrivals and departures).  In the wake of the crisis, 
the number of aircraft handled dropped to 41,057 in 1998.  Since 2000, there has been a 
rebound in traffic with 66,275 aircraft arrivals and departures in 2002.  This compares 
with the 46,100 aircraft movements at Denpasar’s Ngurah Rai airport in 2002.  That 
Surabaya remains Indonesia’s second busiest airport reflects Juanda airport’s important 
role as an air hub for Eastern Indonesia.  After a prolonged period of planning and 
review, work has commenced at Juanda on a second runway and terminal facility that is 
being built with Japanese private and government funds. 
 
Electricity 
 
The limited capacity of East Java’s electricity generation and supply network has for 
some time imposed an important infrastructure constraint on manufacturing in the 
province.11  East Java’s electricity charges are reportedly high in comparison with 
Jakarta/West Java and hence impact on manufacturing costs.  Demand for electricity in 
East Java is growing at a rate of 5 per cent per year and a gap has been created between 
peak electricity load and capacity to supply.  It was also reported that the imbalance 
between electricity demand and supply is likely to affect the province’s industrial output 
in 2004 (Jawa Pos, 2 January 2003). 
 
Finance and banking  
 
East Java’s banking sector is skewed towards retail banking rather than providing credit 
for small and medium enterprise development.  Surabaya holds a dominant position in 
East Java’s banking infrastructure, housing the majority of the province’s 1,150 domestic, 
                                                 
11   Yamashita (September 2002). 
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foreign and joint venture banks.  Domestic commercial banks in Surabaya control 62 per 
cent of total bank deposits held in the province.  Bank Mandiri, Bank Negara Indonesia 
(BNI) and Maspion Bank are the top three banks.   
 
Foreign banks, representing about 9 per cent of banks in East Java, are not considered to 
play a strong role in lending for industrial development.  Eleven foreign banks currently 
operate in Indonesia and maintain representative offices in Surabaya, including ABN-
Amro Bank, Standard Chartered Bank, HSBC, Citibank and Australia’s Commonwealth 
Bank.  The foreign banking sector offers a range of products designed to appeal to 
established large corporate customers, eg credit cards, trade finance, export credit, project 
finance and investment products.  The newest foreign bank in East Java is the 
Commonwealth Bank which opened a retail branch Surabaya in April 2003.  It derives 
most of its income from private banking, especially in home and car loans. 
 
Investment climate 
 
The perceived hidden cost of investing in East Java may be a factor that has stymied 
growth in manufacturing.  According to Regional Autonomy Watch’s 2003 Survey of 
Regional Investment Attractiveness, three Kabupaten/Kotamadya in East Java (Kediri, 
Malang and Sidoarjo) rank among Indonesia’s 20 most attractive sub-provincial locations 
for investment (8th, 15th and 17th respectively).  However, the survey found that illegal 
levies were an integral feature of investing in all the regions examined.  In Sidoarjo for 
example, up to 36 per cent of manufacturing enterprises were aware of some form of levy 
imposed by local police while 27 per cent of businesses claimed to have been targeted by 
‘social organisations’ soliciting donations. 
 
As a result of these ‘informal’ constraints on investment, sub-provincial governments 
have had to be inventive in offering incentives to potential investors to their regions.  
Both the Sidoarjo and Kediri Kabupaten administrations have set up industrial estates to 
attract industry to locate in their regions. 
 
East Java planners have strongly encouraged domestic and foreign investment in 
industrial estates.  In East Java, the output of industrial estates is predominantly intended 
for the domestic market.  East Java boasts four established sites: SIER (Surabaya 
Industrial Estate Rungkut), Ngoro Industri Persada (NIP) in Mojokerto, PIER (Pasuruan 
Industrial Estate Rembang) in Pasuruan, and most recently, KIM (Kawasan Industri 
Maspion) an industrial estate developed by Maspion Group which is located between 
Surabaya and Gresik.12  All of these industrial estates support elaborately transformed 
manufacturing.   
 
The Impact of Government Policy 
 
Government policy has had a major impact on the development of manufacturing 
industry in East Java.  As Dick et al (1993) noted, East Java’s success in social and 
                                                 
12 PT Maspion is located in Sidoarjo and employs over 30,000 people in consumer and aluminium goods 
manufacturing. 
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economic policies was at least in part attributable to a professional bureaucracy and the 
perceived legitimacy of the provincial administration. 
 
In 1984, the East Java Provincial Agency for Manufacturing (Dinas Perindustrian 
Daerah Propinsi Daerah Tingkat I Jawa Timur) introduced a Master Plan for the 
development of manufacturing industry in the province in Law Number 5.  Article 20, 
paragraph 1 of this Law stated that: “The government may determine growth poles and 
manufacturing locations which conform with the goal of the National Archipelagic 
Concept (Wawasan Nusantara)”.  Through the Law, the East Java Government sought to 
establish growth poles for manufacturing, “…not considering industry-specific resources 
only, but also other development inputs, for example human resource factors, geographic 
location factors, infrastructure, and other supporting factors”. 
 
However the advent of regional autonomy (Otonomi Daerah) in 2001 has altered the 
inter-relationship between the different levels of government in East Java and weakened 
the role of policy-makers at provincial level, including with respect to the formulation of 
industry policy.  Before decentralisation, East Java’s BAPPEPROP, the provincial 
development planning board established by the provincial government, had a dual role of 
policy maker and development planning coordinator. 13  Decentralization has changed 
BAPPEPROP’s role in the planning process, from an essential element linking the 
provincial government with sub-provincial administrators to that of an advisor to the 
various Kabupaten and Kotamadya within the province. 
 
Under regional autonomy, Kabupaten and Kotamadya administrations in Indonesia have 
a key planning role and more authority than provincial governments.   As has occurred in 
other parts of Indonesia, sub-provincial administrations in East Java have used their 
authority to formulate policy independently of the provincial government, particularly in 
the field of taxation and regulation.  At the same time, the provincial government has 
attempted to maintain its influence on industry by introducing regulations and local levies 
(Pendapatan Asli Daerah - PAD), many of which duplicate regulations that have been 
issued by Kabupaten and Kotamadya governments. As a result, many economic activities 
are doubly burdened with identical or similar levies. 
 
It may be argued that increasing recourse to PAD levies on the part of the East Java 
provincial and sub-provincial administrations is likely to hinder manufacturing growth.  
According to a recent survey, 58 per cent of businesses in Sidoarjo complained that 
increased taxes and levies under decentralisation posed a burden on their operations.14  
Food manufacturer, Nestle, for example, paid up to Rp 80 million to fulfil a local 
government requirement to renew a ‘disturbance permit’.  There is a danger that PAD 
levies will become an impost on the most profitable industries, such as cigarette 
manufacturers.  PT Gudang Garam, for example, contributes Rp 5 billion to Kabupaten 
Kediri’s coffers each year in local taxes.15
                                                 
13 Pratono (2004) 
14 (Agus Pramusinto 2004) Paper presented at Asian Studies Association of Australia National Conference, 
Canberra, 1 July 2004. 
15 Author’s fieldnotes (McMichael, 2003).  As the country’s highest corporate taxpayer, PT Gudang Garam 
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While it is still too early to speculate with confidence, it seems reasonable to assume that 
regional autonomy in East Java will encourage sub-provincial administrations to become 
more competitive in offering investment incentives.  This could result in an increased 
variety of manufacturing industry policy within the Province.  Whether the emergence of 
a plethora of new investment and manufacturing policies would be attractive to new 
investors remains to be seen. 
 
One area where government policy in East Java has failed to create an enabling 
environment for the nurturing of manufacturing is in the field of industry research and 
development.  A lack of adequate government guidance and financial support has 
contributed to minimal local R and D inputs in the manufacturing sector and a dearth of 
innovative product development.  Industry in East Java relies heavily on foreign 
technology inputs and modern management precepts such as Total Quality Control and 
just-in-time inventories.  Surabaya hosts the PT PAL shipyard, which during the Soeharto 
era, was Indonesia’s leading marine design innovator.  However, there has been little 
transfer of technology from this national institution to local manufacturing entities. 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
The foregoing analysis suggests industrial development in East Java does exhibit special 
characteristics by virtue of its historical growth and largely domestic orientation.  The 
story of manufacturing industry in East Java is basically one of failure to take advantage 
of considerable resource endowments and diversify into international markets.  
Particularly since the Asian financial crisis, East Java’s manufacturing sector has not 
performed as well as other similarly well-endowed regions in Southeast Asia and has 
fallen behind some other provinces of Indonesia in comparative terms.  The province’s 
considerable physical infrastructure endowments; the educational level of attainment of 
its population16; and its public sector tradition of sound economic and financial 
management stand out as factors that should have propelled East Java manufacturing to a 
position of regional if not international significance.  That this has not occurred may be 
explained in terms of both internal and external factors. 
 
Within East Java, allocation of foreign and domestic investment in transport and power 
generation infrastructure, two key elements in the growth of an efficient manufacturing 
industry, has been largely centred on the SUGRESID region surrounding Surabaya.  
Little government revenue has been made available to develop infrastructure in other less 
dynamic regions of the province.  This pattern of concentrating infrastructure spending in 
the greater Surabaya economic region has had the effect of tying up the province’s 
manufacturing activity in its economic heartland.  However, concentrating manufacturing 
in the Surabaya region has exacerbated an existing transport bottleneck and disrupted the 
timely distribution of East Java’s industrial goods to domestic and international markets. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
returns around Rp 1 trillion in excise to the Indonesian government. 
16 Jones (1993) suggests the level of attainment in primary and secondary schooling was below the rest of 
Indonesia until the 1970s but increased through the 1980s to match that for Indonesia as a whole. 
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It will be difficult for East Java to improve its international competitiveness to any 
substantive degree if the province’s manufacturing output remains dependent on a few 
ISIC categories into the foreseeable future, principally food, beverages, and tobacco.  
East Java’s principal manufactured exports are precisely those subject to increasing 
competition from low-cost industrial production in other Asian countries.  A lack of a 
diversified industrial base, a narrow range of exports and the failure to establish strong 
linkages with international capital and markets is likely to continue to retard foreign and 
domestic investment flows into the manufacturing sector. 
 
At the same time, Surabaya will continue to be an important supplier of household items, 
consumables and equipment to markets throughout eastern Indonesia and for major 
resource exploitation projects in Sulawesi, NTT Province and Papua.  In East Java, strong 
brand loyalty amongst consumers means that local companies are able to sustain solid 
profits through being identified as East Java entities.  For example, in recent years Jawa 
Pos Group, originally relying on its flagship Surabaya daily newspaper, has diversified its 
business interests into publishing, tourism, and property.  The firm’s commercial success 
owes much to its popular identification as an East Java company. 
 
It would be reasonable to expect that levies on industry, both legal (eg PAD) and illegal 
(eg wild harvest – ‘pungutan liar’) have had a negative impact on manufacturing in East 
Java.  It is difficult to determine, however, to what extent these imposts have constrained 
growth in manufacturing compared with other provinces where such levies also abound.17
 
Political economy considerations have had a distinct bearing on East Java’s 
manufacturing landscape.  It is widely believed that two of the most important power 
brokers in East Java, the conservative socio-religious Muslim organisation, Nahdlatul 
Ulama (NU) and the military (TNI), both provide finance and political protection for 
certain industries in the province.  For example in Trawas south of Surabaya, the NU has 
an investment in a salak fruit and banana processing enterprise.  As the influence of 
political parties in national and provincial politics grows, it is likely that more political 
pressure will be exerted on sub-provincial legislatures to formulate policy to the 
advantage of certain manufacturing ventures associated with particular party interests (for 
instance with respect to spending on infrastructure). 
 
National government policies have favoured Jakarta/West Java as a location for 
manufacturing investment because of the region’s well-developed infrastructure, large 
pool of skilled labour, easier access to capital and dominant hold on international trade 
and investment flows.  The promotion of industry growth in regions nearest Jakarta may 
help to account for the relatively poor performance of East Java’s manufacturing sector in 
comparison with Jakarta/West Java.   
 
                                                 
17 Leading East Java processed food manufacturer, PT Pangan Lestari, is unconcerned by levies imposed on 
it by Kabupaten Sidoarjo.  The company considers its PAD payments are not excessive and that the 
introduction of regional autonomy has not increased its fiscal obligations to local government.  (Interview 
with Business Development Manager, PT Pangan Lestari, Sidoardjo, 24 April 2003).  For a more in-depth 
discussion of the effect of illegal fees and charges on manufacturing, see Bambang Brodjonegoro (2004). 
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The ‘balanced development’ paradigm put forward by Dick and other researchers in the 
1990s still rings true for East Java.  The province survived the Asian financial crisis in 
relatively good shape by national standards because of several factors: a lesser 
dependence, in comparison with Jakarta, on international financial markets and highly 
exposed national banks; a more flexible, smaller-scale and domestic-oriented industry 
base; and an absence of the corrupt business practices of the crony capitalists associated 
with the Soeharto regime during the economic boom years of the mid-1990s.  But the 
development of a broad industrial base in East Java has not led to a diversification of the 
province’s manufacturing sector and forging of links with international markets.  
Although other manufacturing-intensive provinces of Indonesia were more affected by 
the crisis, their export orientation and responsiveness to changes in global demand have 
given them an internationally competitive edge over East Java industry. 
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APPENDICES 
 
Table A1 
Number of employees in selected provinces 
 
  1986 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 1999 2002 
Manufacturing         
North Sumatera 97,310 144,702 182,597 213,256 261,180 228,267 230,237 230,038 
Jakarta 426,512 557,646 477,753 617,118 539,760 530,025 616,272 588,416 
West Java 669,838 1,203,510 1,505,127 1,962,642 1,986,711 1,741,014 2,173,871 2,069,014
Yogyakarta 48,128 71,609 66,514 73,367 76,310 74,472 81,779 116,631 
Central Java 658,274 876,471 944,475 1,361,891 1,284,201 1,193,412 1,409,793 1,591,906
East Java 796,845 941,993 1,148,507 1,485,926 1,206,675 1,306,728 1,405,030 1,643,691
Other 408,581 499,733 545,451 782,177 861,540 881,617 779,852 1,701,605
Indonesia 3,105,488 4,295,664 4,870,424 6,496,377 6,216,377 5,955,535 6,696,834 7,941,301
         
Other   
North Sumatera 772,403 928,843 877,394 1,169,830 1,321,575 1,438,471 1,341,091 1,468,982
Jakarta 1,093,451 1,408,718 1,374,075 1,501,780 1,737,612 1,741,775 1,750,962 1,699,468
West Java 3,018,600 3,531,065 4,077,523 4,135,424 4,564,647 4,626,305 4,347,302 4,245,126
Yogyakarta 301,549 321,978 371,130 388,240 435,146 442,104 461,957 515,844 
Central Java 2,874,481 3,180,722 3,235,166 3,612,242 3,816,219 3,472,054 3,594,880 4,083,924
East Java 3,167,198 3,576,868 3,746,399 4,322,140 4,677,636 4,533,876 4,429,321 5,055,036
Other 3,247,354 3,832,595 4,470,334 5,437,291 8,799,848 6,595,301 6,761,201 8,113,639
Indonesia 14,475,036 16,780,789 18,152,021 20,566,947 22,735,364 22,849,886 22,686,714 25,182,019
         
Total         
North Sumatera 869,713 1,073,545 1,059,991 1,383,086 1,582,755 1,666,738 1,571,328 1,699,020
Jakarta 1,519,963 1,966,364 1,851,828 2,118,898 2,277,372 2,271,800 2,367,234 2,287,884
West Java 3,688,438 4,734,575 5,582,650 6,098,066 6,551,358 6,367,319 6,521,173 6,314,140
Yogyakarta 349,677 393,587 437,644 461,607 511,456 516,576 543,736 632,475 
Central Java 3,532,755 4,057,193 4,179,641 4,974,133 5,100,420 4,665,466 5,004,673 5,675,830
East Java 3,964,043 4,518,861 4,894,906 5,808,066 5,884,311 5,840,604 5,834,351 6,698,727
         
Indonesia 17,580,524 21,076,453 23,022,445 27,063,324 28,951,741 28,805,421 29,383,548 33,123,320
Source: National Labour Force Survey (SAKERNAS), :Laborers /Employees Situation in Indonesia, 
various years. 
 
 
 
 
Table A2 
Percentage of employees in selected provinces 
 
  1986 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 1999 2002 
Manufacturing         
North Sumatera 3.1 3.4 3.7 3.3 4.2 3.8 3.4 2.9 
Jakarta 13.7 13.0 9.8 9.5 8.7 8.9 9.2 7.4 
West Java 21.6 28.0 30.9 30.2 32.0 29.2 32.5 26.1 
Yogyakarta 1.5 1.7 1.4 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.2 1.5 
Central Java 21.2 20.4 19.4 21.0 20.7 20.0 21.1 20.0 
East Java 25.7 21.9 23.6 22.9 19.4 21.9 21.0 20.7 
Other 13.2 11.6 11.2 12.0 13.9 14.8 11.6 21.4 
Indonesia 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
         
Other         
North Sumatera 5.3 5.5 4.8 5.7 5.8 6.3 5.9 5.8 
Jakarta 7.6 8.4 7.6 7.3 7.6 7.6 7.7 6.7 
West Java 20.9 21.0 22.5 20.1 20.1 20.2 19.2 16.9 
Yogyakarta 2.1 1.9 2.0 1.9 1.9 1.9 2.0 2.0 
Central Java 19.9 19.0 17.8 17.6 16.8 15.2 15.8 16.2 
East Java 21.9 21.3 20.6 21.0 20.6 19.8 19.5 20.1 
Other 22.4 22.8 24.6 26.4 27.2 28.9 29.8 32.2 
Indonesia 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
         
Total         
North Sumatera 4.9 5.1 4.6 5.1 5.5 5.8 5.3 5.1 
Jakarta 8.6 9.3 8.0 7.8 7.9 7.9 8.1 6.9 
West Java 21.0 22.5 24.2 22.5 22.6 22.1 22.2 19.1 
Yogyakarta 2.0 1.9 1.9 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.9 1.9 
Central Java 20.1 19.2 18.2 18.4 17.6 16.2 17.0 17.1 
East Java 22.5 21.4 21.3 21.5 20.3 20.3 19.9 20.2 
Other 20.8 20.6 21.8 23.0 24.3 26.0 25.7 29.6 
Indonesia 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
Source: National Labour Force Survey (SAKERNAS), :Laborers /Employees Situation in Indonesia, 
various years. 
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Table A3 
Distribution of medium and large manufacturing value added industry (percent) 2002 
 
    Jakarta West Java East Java Indonesia
15 food products and beverages 5.33 5.63 13.60 12.78 
16 tobacco 0.00 1.46 32.44 7.96 
17 textiles 3.19 18.75 1.23 6.74 
18 wearing apparel 8.99 5.04 1.20 2.32 
19 tanning and dressing of leather 0.70 4.49 2.50 2.96 
20 wood and product of wood except furniture and plaiting materials 0.28 1.08 4.09 7.19 
21 paper and paper products 1.14 4.88 5.47 5.89 
22 publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media 1.58 0.19 0.44 0.37 
23 coal, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 0.01 0.30 0.06 0.02 
24 chemicals and chemical products 13.05 12.99 7.04 10.49 
25 rubber and plastic products 1.77 6.56 4.13 4.13 
26 other non-metallic mineral products 5.09 2.57 5.89 6.46 
27 basic metal 4.92 2.90 6.18 6.16 
28 fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment 3.77 4.83 2.66 1.55 
29 machinery and equipment n.e.c. 1.75 1.40 1.34 5.15 
30 office, accounting, and computing machinery 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 
31 electrical machinery and apparatus  n.e.c. 5.46 2.68 5.01 2.16 
32 radio, television and communication equipment and apparatus 1.23 5.58 0.04 3.10 
33 medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks 0.79 0.41 0.07 0.22 
34 motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 26.49 5.32 0.74 7.57 
35 other transport equipment 12.40 11.07 1.85 2.64 
36 furniture and manufacturing n.e.c. 2.04 1.86 3.16 3.95 
37 recycling 0.02 0.01 0.86 0.17 
    100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Source: BPS.  
 
 
Table A4 
Structure of East Java’s manufacturing value added (MVA) at current prices: 
1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000 
 
ISIC  1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 
 Light Industries      
311 Food and beverages 14.39 15.40 9.85 6.39 9.03 
312 Food and beverages 1.50 3.69 4.40 2.89 5.39 
313 Beverages 2.20 1.09 1.09 1.23 0.45 
314 Processed tobacco and cigarette flavors 52.27 42.04 46.45 45.58 38.22 
321 Textile 4.14 3.80 2.96 1.93 2.11 
322 Clothes except footwear 0.10 0.38 0.36 0.67 1.00 
323 Tanneries and leather finishing, product of leather, except footwear 0.24 0.47 0.17 0.10 0.24 
324 Footwear 0.04 0.14 1.41 3.92 2.52 
331 Wood, bamboo, rattan, willow and the like 1.81 2.70 2.38 2.09 2.08 
332 Furniture and fixtures; kitchen utensils of wood, bamboo, and rattan 0.06 0.13 1.02 1.15 1.33 
342 Printing, publishing and allied industries 0.27 0.41 0.58 0.70 0.54 
355 Rubber and rubber products 0.13 0.55 0.60 0.35 0.38 
356 Plastic products 0.15 1.23 2.07 1.92 2.21 
390 Other manufacturing industries 0.02 0.04 0.13 0.27 0.93 
  77.31 72.07 73.46 69.21 66.44 
 Heavy Industries      
341 Paper, paper products, and the like 1.62 3.94 7.90 5.15 12.20 
351 Industrial chemical 7.34 6.89 4.57 2.78 3.54 
352 Other chemical industries 3.44 5.69 2.73 3.47 2.81 
353 Petroleum refineries and natural gas     0.00 
354 Products of petroleum refineries and coal 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.10 
361 Porcelain 0.10 0.10 0.45 0.53 0.27 
362 Glass and glass products 0.56 0.44 0.88 1.11 0.80 
363 Cement, lime and products of cement and lime 3.19 1.81 0.54 1.18 1.99 
364 Clay products 0.10 0.15 0.07 0.05 0.03 
369 Other non-metallic mineral products 0.14 0.13 0.34 0.20 0.22 
371 Iron and steel basic industries 0.28 0.57 2.57 8.73 4.24 
372 Non ferrous metal basic industries 0.00 0.00 0.83 0.17 1.85 
381 Fabricated metal product, except machinery and equipments 1.96 2.96 1.90 2.51 2.76 
382 Machineries except electrical 1.64 2.72 0.94 0.90 0.20 
383 Electrical machineries, apparatus, appliances and supplies 1.09 1.31 0.73 0.98 1.27 
384 Transport equipments 1.20 1.20 2.03 2.93 1.23 
385 Professionals, scientific, measuring and controlling equipments 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.09 0.06 
  22.69 27.93 26.54 30.79 33.56 
Source: BPS.  
 
 
